DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS.
BY ANTONIO LLANO.

HUMAN

PERFECTION,

or the perfecting of mankind, has

often been proposed as the object as well as the criterion of

Although absolute perfection, in the sense of a state than
which there is not a better, may not be readily apprehended, nor,
ethics.

much

less, realised,

yet

we can form

a clear conception of relative

perfection, in the sense of a condition better than the present con-

any other condition taken as a term of comparison.
whatever its particular views, deals with the
means of bettering the condition of man, whether individually or
collectively, or at least with the means of keeping that condition
from retrograding, we may perhaps with propriety say that every
system of ethics aims at the perfection of mankind or, in the language of moral philosophy, that perfection is the end of ethics.
Nor is this all the very word end implies that the relative perfection we have in view is not to be considered as a means or instrudition, or than

And, since

ethics,

all

;

:

ment
that

in the

prosecution of some farther object

farther object, not perfection,

;

for in this case

would be the end

of ethics.

This we express by saying that perfection, of one kind or another,
is to be considered as an end in itself, to be striven after for its own
sake, and not for the sake of something else although it is obvious
;

that, there

being no end without a means, ethics must necessarily

relate to the

means

than to the end

requisite for the attainment of the end, no less

itself.

But the nature

of this

end

vague, according to the view

is

more or

we take

less definite,

of perfection,

more or
i.

e.

,

less

accord-

norm constituting our ethical guide and standard. We
may, with the hedonist, make of pleasurable feeling our standard
of perfection
and the practice of morality, in this case, being diing to the

j
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rected towards the enjoyment of pleasure, either by ourselves or

we have secured our end, in every special instance, when
we or others have experienced the feelings in question and
feelings being all we seek, we may describe them as consti-

others,

either

these

;

an end, moreover, which is perfectly defiand v/hose character as an end its finalness is distinctly perOr we may, with the ordinary intuitionist, establish a
ceived.
difference between the "higher" and the ''lower" natures of man,
tuting an end by itself

;

—

nite,

including in the former

—

his virtuous tendencies, or the dictates

all

"moral sense" and in this case (although the distinction is
by no means clear), we may still say that a given virtue, such as
chastity (a favorite "virtue" with many writers, among them Mr.
Lecky), is to be practised for no other reason than because it is an
of his

;

element of our " better nature " because we know (or, rather, feel')
that it is better to be pure than to be impure, irrespective of all
consequences, either to ourselves or others.
Here, also, as in the
preceding instance, we have an end by itself, inasmuch as virtuous
actions are performed, not in order to attain any remote ends, but
because we conceive that by performing them we are what we
"ought to be." In both of the above cases the object in view is
;

the satisfaction of what

is,

or

is

alleged to be, a specific feeling

;

and once the feeling has been satisfied, our goal, for the time, has
been reached. The common characteristic of the two systems is
that they both present a relatively final condition, whether pleasure or virtuousness, as the object of conduct; that they both find
the ethical standard in an ideal capable of being completely realised.

The

case, however,

is

somewhat

different

when we consider
v^hen we

perfection in a dynamical instead of a statical sense

;

regard morality as a factor in the evolution of mankind, subject
itself to

the laws of change and adaptation, and playing no other

human race
The difference

part than that of an accelerating force impelling the
in its

uninterrupted onward and upward motion.

between

this position

and those mentioned above

the intuitionist and the evolutio-hedonist

may

is,

that,

although

hold, and do hold,

a very powerful element in the development of the

that morality

is

race, yet

not a necessary consequence of their views that mor-

ality

it is

should be practised because of

other words, development

On

its

developmental value

;

in

not their ethical criterion or standard.
the other hand, the doctrine now under consideration regards

morality as having

human

is

progress for

its

main object

follows that progress, in one form or another,

is

\

whence

it

the ethical crite-
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standard b)' which conduct is to be judged and measured.
system of ethics of this description may, I think, be more parIts distinctive characterticularly termed an ethics of perfection.
that the end of every moral action, being subservistic lies in this
ient to the farther end of human progress, is only a relative end,
not an end by itself and, as such, may be more adequately described as a means, while the real end of ethics is a never-realised
ideal which recedes from us in proportion as we approach it, or
which constantly and continuously changes in proportion as it is
We may, however, take another view of the
partially realised.
matter, and, by picturing to ourselves the evolution of the race as
an unceasing motion, consider this motion as an end by itself,
which, with respect to our actions, is attained when we are satisfied that they have been factors contributory to the preservation or
rion, the

A

—

;

acceleration of that motion.

Of

all

the various forms in which the ethics of perfection has

is one which, affirming to be founded exclusively
on the law of cosmic evolution, as that law is understood by the
foremost thinkers of the age, claims for itself, as legitimate property, the title of evolutionary ethics.
Unfortunately, however, this
appellation has been already appropriated by such systems as those
presented in the works of Leslie Stephen and Herbert Spencer,
whose doctrines, from a purely ethical point of view, are almost
(not entirely) diametrically opposed to the doctrines with which I

appeared, there

am now

It becomes necessary, therefore, to make a disand I think we may give the name developmetital ethics to
that system of ethics whose moral standard is development, especially mental development
in which the morality of an action is
measured by its fitness to enter as a new factor in the sum total of

dealing.

tinction,

;

forces impelling the

Of

human

this ethics Dr.

race in its upward motion.
Paul Carus, editor of The Monist,

strong adherent and enthusiastic advocate.

It is

is

a very

the object of the

present essay to examine the most salient points of his doctrines, as

they can be gathered from his numerous writings. I shall, first, endeavor to present an outline of his views, not indeed in the literal

form

in

which he has stated them, but as they can be logically

terpreted.

In following this

method

of exposition

I

am

in-

not actu-

ated by the pretentious hope of improving upon Dr. Carus's lucid
and vigorous presentation of his subject my reasons are of a more
plausible nature. In the first place, an uninterrupted series of quotations is almost always monotonous, especially when they are
:

from a well-known writer

;

and, in the second place, the

critic,

by
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presenting, as he understands them, the views he wishes to discuss,

shows at once what he conceives the position of his author to be,
and on what interpretation of his author's ideas he will base his
criticism.

II.

Having, through the constant study of nature, acquired a scienor positivist habit of mind, we have reversed the principles of
and, no longer seeking to evolve
the old systems of philosophy
natural phenomena from the purely formal operations of our untific

;

derstanding,

we seek

in natural

phenomena

the materials to be

combined and elaborated in those operations. However consistent
our theories, however rigorous our reasonings, they will evidently
remain nothing but pure forms of thought, answering to no objective realities, unless the premises have been taken from the objective world itself.

But,

pure formal thought

is

if it is

true that, in the language of Kant,

''empty,"

it

is

equally true that pure sen-

sations, the data of experience, are " blind ";

whence the

necessity,

on the one side, of looking in experience for the real content of
knowledge, and, on the other side, of looking in formal thought for
the meaning or interpretation of sensations. Experience furnishes
the premises, but logic must give us the conclusions
without the
:

classifications of experience in the categories of formal thought, the

coherence and unification in which real knowledge consist would
be impossible; man might be a sentient being, but not a cogitative
The laws of logic, however, are not isolated subjectivities,
being.
disconnected from the world of experience they are conditions of
thought corresponding to certain conditions of objective reality
they have been arrived at by the elimination of all the special properties of reality, except the most general property, without which
no reality can be conceived, viz., fortn. The laws of logic being,
then, nothing but the laws of form, they must be applicable to any
system of reality where form is the primary condition of existence.
It follows that to that regularity and uniformity known in logic as
consistency, there must correspond that regularity and uniformity
in nature we describe by the term law
Hence we
natural law.
arrive at the conception of the universe as being not a chaos, but
of necessity a cosmos, an orderly concatenation of causes and effects,
where events, which are only changes of form, are invariably determined by the preceding forms of existence.
Furthermore, the
correspondence between the operations of formal thought and the
:

:

—

1
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objective realities of nature arises from their very identity, or their
oneness ; for the laws of logic are the subjective aspect of the lavs^s
of nature

working

in the cerebral

substance

they do not dictate or

;

create order, but are the consciousness of the order followed by nature in the process of organisation

becoming aware

they are self-conscious nature,

:

of the conditions she

the course of her evolution

fulfilled, in

has

fulfilled,

— nature,

and must have

so to speak, inter-

preting herself.^
of law, we ask ourselves
phenomenal world in its entirety,
we arrive at very important generalisations. Not only the very conception of the universe as a cosmos leads us to consider it as a unitary system of reality, but the development of all scientific knowledge points in the same direction. Knowledge is a continuous
If,

having established the universality

what view we are

to take of the

process of inclusion and harmonisation
that every

included

new

in, a

us as a law

;

fact is

understood when

:

it

of inclusion, in the sense

has been referred

to,

or

general order of facts or experiences formulated by

of harmonisation, in the sense that the inclusion of a

particular fact in a general order of facts consists in harmonising

known

facts, in

subjective requisite of consistency.

In this

the

new

fact with the other

making objective the
manner we are led, by

the very nature of cognition, to the theoretical conclusion that a
perfect understanding of the v/hole world of
sible

by the reduction

versal law, of

of all

modes

phenomena

of existence to

is

only pos-

one single, uni-

which particular laws are but special manifestations,

or special aspects, conditioned by the special forms in which the

one universal law exhibits itself. Thus the consistency of facts with
one another is easily accounted for on the theory of their oneness
a theory which is not merely the result of abstract speculation, but
a legitimate induction based on the well-established truths of experimental science. All science, indeed, aims at the realisation of
monism, of a continuity in nature which is the characteristic mark
of its unity
and, as said before, the solution of scientific problems
consists in bringing new phenomena within the applicability of one
law, or in extending the range of the law so as to make it embrace,
;

;

in a synthetic whole,

solved problem

is

a greater

number

pears on the solution of the problem
tinuity exists, the
1

of

phenomena.

An

un-

an apparent break of continuity, which disap:

so long as the break of con-

problem remains unsolved.^

See chapter on "Form and Formal Thought" in Dr. C^xms's Fundamental Problems, 2nd

Chicago, 1894.
See Fundamental Problems, pp. 7, 20, 21, 22; also. The Monist, I., 2, p. 240. "The unitary
conception of the world has become a postulate of science. Indeed, the single sciences, each one

edit.,
2
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all efforts di-

one universal whole and the
philosophers of the past were, and many of our own generation are,
wont to dwell, sometimes with devout satisfaction, sometimes with
the pangs of despair, on the impassable chasm, impossible of being
bridged, separating the realm of life and consciousness from the
lower realm of dead and inert matter. To-day, however, with the
progress of natural science, the chasm is becoming narrower and
narrower and if we cannot say that we have actually bridged it,
we can, in some measure, see one shore from the other shore, and
are not unwarranted in suggesting the means by which the intervening distance may be satisfactorily spanned. The doctrine of
evolution, by tracing the most complex forms of life to the relatively
simple compound known as protoplasm, has familiarised us with
the truth that matter is possessed of potentialities never before
dreamed of, and also with the all-important truth that two phases
of the same process may appear, when taken at sufficient distance
from each other, as independent, and even disparate, facts but
that, by gradual, infinitesimal changes of the one fact, we may
A gap in
finally arrive at the other as its necessary consequence.
nature may, therefore, simply indicate, not that the gap is so in
reality, but that we are unacquainted with the ''connecting links."
Were we ignorant of the laws of thermotics, we should, no doubt,
dogmatically affirm, as an axiomatic truth, that so disparate two
facts as heat and cold could never change into each other, nor one
originate from the other.
The thermometer, however, soon convinces us of our error while, if we stop to reflect on the gradual
change of a low into a high temperature, all the apparent contradiction disappears at once.
A chasm between any two facts of nature is a subjective discontinuity, not an objective discontinuity; it
is a discontinuous perception of a continuous reality.
Since, according to the theory of evolution, the most complex
forms of consciousness have evolved from the apparently unconscious protoplasm, we must believe that the material elements constituting this protoplasm already contain, in a latent form, all the
elements of mind
contain feeling in potentia, not otherwise than as
molar motion contains the potentialities of heat ; or, to use a very
striking illustration, as darkness contains the potentialities of light.
rected towards including

it

in the

;

;

;

;

;

worked out and endeavored to verify the principles of monism.
Every fact which seems to contradict the principle of unity must be, and indeed it is, considered
as a problem until it conforms to it. As soon as it is found to be in unison with all the other
facts the problem is solved." [Fundamental Problems, p. 22.)

in its province, have always

1

The Monist,

I., i,

pp. 85-86.
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And

it

does not require a long stretch of imagination, nor is it
very potentialities

illogical or unscientific to conclude, that those

exist as constituent elements of the material particles

the protoplasm

;

composing

while the transition from unorganised matter to

no more impossible (although we are as
mere protoplasman. In this hypothesis the vexed question as to the

protoplasmic matter

is

yet ignorant of the process) than the transition of

mic matter

to

origin of life disappears as

property of

all

explanation.

''What
form

of

is

unmeaning

The problem,

then,

the origin of life?" but

matter

known

life,

:

matter, and, as matter,

is

science to

for

— "What

And

protoplasm?"

as

not only scientifically intelligible, but

in its

eternal,

its

is

rudiments,

and

is

solve,

is

a

no

calls for

not,

the origin of that

the latter problem

solution

is

is

readily con-

ceived as both possible and probable.^
1

Dr. Carus's views as to the universality of life

110-133, 185-187, 300.

His views on

"The

Origin of

may be found in Fundamental Problems, pp.
" may be read in The Monist, I., i, and

Mind

pp. 345-347. The theory of the origin of mind from what Professor Clifford called "mind-stuff," or "elements of feeling," is very clearly and forcibly stated by Dr.

Fundamental Problems,

in the following terms: " Subjectivity cannot originate out of nothing; it must be conceived as the product of a co-operation of certain elements which are present in the objective
world. In other words, the elements of the subjective world are features that we must suppose
to be inseparably united with the elements of the objective world which are represented in our

Carus

mind

as motions. This leads to the conclusion that feeling has to be considered not as a simple
but as a complex phenomenon. Feelings originate through a combination of elements of feeling;
and the presence of elements of feeling must be supposed to be an intrinsic property of the objective world."
{The Monist, I., i, p. 72.) "As light originates out of darkness, being a special

mode

of motion, so feeling originates out of the not-feeling.

the conditions of feeling in a similar

way

The

not-feeling accordingly contains

as potential energy contains the potentiality of kinetic

energy, or as molar motion contains potentially the molecular motion of heat, light, and electri{/iJ/o'., pp. 85-86.)
I have quoted this theory at some length, for two reasons: in the first
place, because it exhibits in a very plain light the scientific and naturalistic, and, therefore, de-

city."

man as a natural phenomenon submitted ultimately to the
laws of chemistry and mechanics (he repudiates this description of his views, but I think its accuracy can be substantiated, making due allowance for the meaning of words), and this is of
great importance for my main purpose and, in the second place (and although this has no direct
bearing on my subject, 1 may be allowed to make a short digression), because, although the theory
is open to serious criticisms (at least as to its form), it is, one of the most striking illustrations of
the revolution worked in philosophy by the evolutionary doctrines and methods of analysis for
we no longer regard natural phenomena as mechanical jnixtures, whose properties are identical
with those of the elements mixed, but as combinations, whose properties, although resultants of
the properties of the combining elements, are not identical with these. The theistic argument of
Locke based on the non-cogitativeness of matter is well known. He argues that, if cogitativeness
were a property of matter, then, since matter is discontinuous (in the sense that it is not all " one
being"), every particle must be cogitative, and every particle being eternal, every particle must
be eternally cogitative, and, therefore (he thinks to have proved that the eternal being must be
"all-knowing"), every particle must be a God. (Locke, Of Human Understanding, book IV.'
chap. X. Comp. Leibnitz, Nouveatix Essais, liv. IV., ch. x. Besides a defective logic, we at once
discover the error of assuming that mind is a simple, irreducible fact, not derivable from another
simple and disparate fact matter and that mind, owing to its very simpleness, is not conceivable except in all its completeness, as we know it in man or imagine it in God. Locke never
thought there could be such a thing as " elements of feeling," or elements of mind, for he took
mind to be undecomposable and it was, therefore, natural for him to suppose that if matter
were cogitative at all, every particle must have a developed will, a perfect memory, and a clear
understanding (although this view, when closely examined, does not tally with the theory of the
acquisition of ideas, which is really a forntatioii of mind).
terministic view Dr. Carus takes of

;

;

—

)

—

;

;
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III.

The foregoing

doctrines as to the nature of the universe and
away, in the first place, with that anthropomorphic view
of the world which postulates an independent and arbitrary will
"directing" all phenomena, either from "within" (and this is
called an immanent God), or from "without," as in all popular
forms of theism ; and, in the second place, with that anthropocentric view which considers the will and the feelings of man as having
a legitimate claim on, and absolute authority over, the processes
going on outside of his conscious being. This radical change of
view as to "man's place in nature" necessarily implies an equally
radical change of view with regard to man's conduct
with regard
The test of all truth is no longer subjective, but objecto ethics.
tive,
not introspective, but experimental; and ethics, if it aspires
to be a science at all, must take its stand on the facts of nature,
considered as objective realities, and formulated into universal laws
by the scientific principles and methods of research. Since our
feelings and our thoughts are not self-existing or independent entities, but are dependent on, and related to, the whole order of
nature, it is necessary to know what that order is, what its laws
are, and how we are connected with them
and this done, we shall
be enabled to enunciate in truly scientific formulas the special
laws of conduct we ordinarily distinguish as ethical rules.
It may be stated at the outset, that the "authority" for ethics,
the ultimate sanction and standard of conduct, can be no other than
the cosmical order itself.
Although the cosmos itself is neither
moral nor immoral, it is the possibility for such a thing as a moral
life; a possibility which, by the development of consciousness, has
become an actuality. When we are convinced that all present existence is but a feature of the one eternal reality, that our consciousness has been formed and moulded by the invariable laws of

man do

—

—

;

the objective world, and that our actions, being special manifestations of those laws through the intermediary of feeling, are really

continuations of an uninterrupted motion which comes from eter-

and goes

and only one, direction
on what, according to the
fancies of our imagination, ought to be, without taking the trouble
to inquire into the deeper question of what, according to the nature of things as we know them by experience, 7nust be and how

nity

then we see

to eternity, following one,

how

idle

it is

to speculate

;

liable

we

are to err when, leaving aside the criterion of objective

THE OPEN COURT,

lyo

we erect our feelings into a criterion of morality, by confusing those things which are logically possible with those that
alone are actually possible, their possibility being no other than
reality,

The can is a prerequisite of the moral ought;
their very existence.
but this can^ in order to be so actually and objectively, has to be an
agreement with the universal laws of nature; in which case the can
is

identical with the must.

The

universal laws of nature, then, being

the necessary conditions of actual possibility, are the only justifica-

moral precepts and the moral ought; and it is a sufficient
guarantee of the morality of an action to show that it harmonises
with those cosmical operations which have been revealed to us by
for only that endures
scientific research. Nor could it be otherwise
tion of the

;

phenomena what
must meet with inevitable ruin; and it is needless to
say that what is doomed to certain failure cannot be a subject of
which, as a part, can

does not

fit

the universal whole of

;

fit

approbation.

In this sense

we may say

dience to the law," and that

"human

that morality

"means

obe-

beings can be moral or im-

moral, according as their conduct agrees with, or does not agree

God" (the universe). ^ Our very existence is involved in our
obedience or disobedience to the supreme authority of nature; if
we wish to exist, we must submit to the "cosmical conditions of
with,

existence," and such actions as conform to those conditions must

be considered "good"; other actions, "bad."^

Were we unacquainted with the direction in which the world
moves, with the line of progress in general, and of human progress
in particular, ethics would have no meaning
in the ignorance of
the causal relations between human actions and their consequences,
one form of conduct could have no more justification than another;
at least, no more a priori justification.
But if there is a law of
progress, a direction in which alone progress can take place, and
if we know that law, then that law is our only possible norm of
morality.^ This norm has been revealed to us by the doctrine
of evolution, the first of whose teachings is, "that life as it is now
can transcend itself; it can transform itself, and must, according to
nature's laws, transform itself into a higher form of life."* When
:

"^Fundamental Problems, pp. 315, 321. Dr. Carus constantly reverts to this position— that the
phenomena of nature are the supreme authority and criterion of ethics. (See, e. g.,
Fundamental Problems, pp. igS, 257, 322, 328. 329; Religion of Science, second edition, Chicago,
1896, pp. 21, 27; Ethical Problem, Chicago, 1890, p. 31
The Monist, I., 4: "The Criterion of Ethics
an Objective Reality.")
objective

;

"i-Ethical

Problem,

p. 31.

^'Homilies of Science Chicago, 1892, p. 37.
,

iFundamenial Problems,
tion."

(The Monist,

VI.,

p. 316.

4, p. 389.)

" Morality

is

that

which

is

in

concord with the law of evolu-
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thus considered as a necessary, continuous upward movement,
and conduct as one of the factors of this movement, the moral
problem appears no longer as a mere question of ought, but mainly
life is

as a question of must:

its

solution consists in rationalising the ought

by bringing it within the pale of the must. Shortly stated, the ethics
of development may be thus formulated
Since the world moves
in a certain direction, it must move in that direction
since it must
:

;

move

in that direction,

who

we,

are but elements of the world, must

Hence development

movement.

act so as to further that

is at

once

the cause, the standard, and the authority of ethics.

Here the very natural question presents

itself

:

What

is

meant

by development, by progress ? To this Dr. Carus answers that
"the test of progress must be sought in the growth of soul." By
soul, of course, he does not mean an independent and "spiritual"
ego, but simply the mental activity of the nervous structure.
For
us, as conscious beings, the world is a system of interconnected

phenomena more

or

less accurately represented,

in the cerebral substance

"imaged,"

number and complexity, the representation gains in acwhich means that we interpret our feelings
more faithful manner, or that there is a closer correspondence

grow

in

curacy and distinctness
in a

or

and, in proportion as our experiences

;

;

between the subjective states and

their objective correlates.

Other-

wise stated, soul-progress consists in a constant approach to truth
for truth is

nothing but the correct interpretation of our feelings,

or a congruity of our mental states with reality.^ Considering, then,
the development of soul as, for us, the most important feature of

cosmical law,
standard

we may accept

of right

and wrong

;

it

this

as a direct criterion of ethics, a

standard not being different from

the law of evolution in general, nor from the supreme standard of
universal law, but simply a special aspect of both, or a special point

view from which we may regard them there being, strictly speakone law by which all phenomena are governed, and to
which all particular laws can and must be referred.^

of

;

ing, only

IV.

Such

are,

if

I

have understood them aright, the fundamental
I have dispensed with minor

principles of developmental ethics.
1

Homilies of Science, pp. 41-42.

I think, are to be taken Dr. Carus's numerous references to the development
of " soul-life" as the ethical criterion. It is man's duty, he says, to do " that which he needs

2

In this sense,

must do, according to the laws of nature, to let his soul grow and expand, and to develop to ever
higher and nobler aims." {The Monist, I., 4, p. 560.) "That which makes our souls grow and
evolve is moral, that which dwarfs our souls and prevents their evolution is immoral." {Homilies
of Science,

p. 47.)

Compare Ethical Problem,

p. 42.
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being my main purpose to discuss the bases of the system but to such particulars as are of capital importance I shall
advert in the course of my discussion. Although I believe that the
postulates set forth by Dr. Carus as the foundations of his ethical
details,

it

;

theory are substantially correct, being identical with the generally
accepted scientific doctrines of to-day, it does not appear to me
that he has

made

a logical application of

them

that

;

is to

say, his

ethical corollaries do not seem to be consistent with the general

which he has endeavored to derive them.
The first objection to the ethics of development is one which,
demolishing, as I conceive, the very foundations, brings the whole
the objection, namely, that the foregoing
structure to the ground
principles themselves are a protest against, and a nullification of,
and that, therefore, it is an incongruity to
all ethical judgments

principles from

;

;

speak of morality as deriving its authority from those principles.
If we are nothing but a part of nature ; if our development obeys
necessary, universal laws ; in short, if we ourselves are natural phenomena, is it not a contradiction to say that we can oppose the laws
All human passions being of
of nature, and be thereby immoral ?
natural growth, are all alike transformations of the one universal
energy, as it operates in the various forms of material existence;
and passions being the springs of our voluntary actions, the action
of the martyr is as natural as the action of his executioner; they
both follow the laws of their natures, that is, the laws of nature ;
"
there is nothing in the one that makes his action more " agreeable
to the

cosmical order than the action of the other

;

and, judged by

the supreme standard of universal law, they are equally moral, that
is to

say, they

both act

in

response to the demands of nature, the

only difference being that nature
ferent organisms.

If,

makes

different

demands upon

dif-

then, the laws of nature in general are to be

accepted as the standard, there is really no standard, for the simple
reason that there is no right or wrong and the everlasting objection against Spinozism remains unanswered, unless we have the
courage to abide by the logical consequences of our postulates, and
;

is no more blamable
than a horse for being a horse. ^ For Spinoza,
however, the scoundrel is simply "excusable"; but, according to
that view which identifies morality with naturalness, the scoundrel

declare, with the philosopher, that a scoundrel
for being a scoundrel

must be declared to be actually moral. In fact, since everything
happens, and every man acts, in absolute conformity with the laws
of nature, the criterion of right is nothing but bare reality; right^Lettre Ue Spinoza

fi

H. Oldenberg (CEuvres,

t.

III.,

pp.

Z7(>--i77,

Saisset's trans., Paris, 1872).
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ness and existence are ultimately one and the same thing and it
were better to do away with all ethical terminology, for such terms
as moral and immoral, good and bad, right and wrong lose all their
significance, when one of the terms of the antithesis has disappeared.
The objection, however, may be partially met by saying, that
our standard is not to be found in the laws of nature in general, but
that ethics takes into considin the law of evolution in particular
eration the difference between actions which tend to promote, and
actions which tend to retard, the evolutionary movement and that
the latter, although really as natural as the former, are by us conceived, at least relatively, as opposed to these, and may, in ordinary language, be said to be antagonistic to the general movement
of the race. There seems, then, no contradiction in classifying conduct, as we classify other natural facts, into two different orders
good actions, which are conducive to development and bad actions, which are opposed to development.
And it may be added
that this distinction, when the words are sufficiently understood,
and the hair-splitting of casuistry is not allowed to confuse what is
plain, is entirely intelligible, and may be legitimately used as the
foundation of a science of morality of an ethics.
Furthermore, it
may be argued that the moral feelings from which ethical judgments
arise, are simply the emotional concomitants of human progress
that the law of society being a law of evolution, special feelings
evolve, as is to be expected, in harmony with the same law
and
that thus both the physiological and the psychological aspects of
morality are perfectly understandable the physiological, in the
sense that a moral person, considered as a social organ, must discharge his functions in a manner subservient to the health and vitality of the whole
the psychological, in the sense that the actions
and judgments of a moral person are accompanied by those characteristic feelings we distinguish as moral feelings.
While the logical cogency of such a reasoning as this will not
be disputed, the assumptions made are open to the following objections.
As regards the physiological aspect of the question, it cannot be denied that, if by ethics is meant 7wthing but the science of
the objective relations and consequences of conduct, viewed from
a purely descriptive and non-emotional point of view, the ethics of
development, being a branch of natural science, rests on as solid a
foundation as human physiology; it may, indeed, be termed social
physiology.^ So long as we confine ourselves to tracing the con;

;

;

:

;

—

;

;

:

;

l"If by moral science," says Fouillee, "we mean the science of the necessary conditions
of individual and social progress, we can understand how it was possible for Spinoza to write

"^^^^
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sequences of murder as affecting the stability of the social group
and the sense of security of its members, its effects upon industry,
trade, and other pursuits of our activity, we are within the limits
But in this there is nothing sufficiently
of descriptive science.

make a separate science, a science of ethics for
we have nothing but a combination of sociology,
in
economy and, if this is all we have to
political
psychology, and
disguising
our surrender of ethics with the
are
only
deal with, we
characteristic to

the above

;

facts

;

obstinate preservation of the name.

Although I believe that this
view
taken
of
the
matter that the rightwill finally be the only
will
finally
disappear
I do not believe that we
and-wrong ethics
state,
or
that
ethics
is
understood in this bare
have reached that

—

—

and indifferent physiological sense. For us ethics implies a special
kind of feelings moral feelings and a special kind of judgments
moral judgments. Ethics, in its present form, deals with the
relations of human conduct considered not only in their external
reality as mere facts or data to be used and elaborated by reason,
according to the pure laws of formal thought it deals with those
our conceprelations in so far as they affect our emotional nature
tions and feelings of right and wrong. The part of science in modern ethics is to bring certain forms of conduct within the pale of the
moral feelings to show the connexion between the various forms
of conduct and a recognised emotional standard.
When the surgeon is asked to justify himself for amputating his patient's limb,
he explains that the operation is necessary in order to save the pa-

—

—

—

:

—

;

tient's life

:

his conduct

his science enables

him

to establish

by showing the agreement

nised moral judgment

— that

the morality of

of his action

with a recog-

man's life.
Ethics, then, must take account of an emotional factor, which,
being indispensable to all ethical judgments, has to be considered
as a criterion
and this criterion, by its very nature, is purely subjective.
To say that the amputation of a gangrened limb will save
a man's life is not an ethical proposition
it is the statement of a
matter of fact, not of a moral judgment.
The moral judgment is
passed when we say that we ought to save the man's life, or that
it is our duty to save the man's life.
Indeed, Dr. Carus himself, by
his frequent references to the ought, the sense of duty, and other
emotional conditions, as inseparable from morality, has virtually
it is

right to save a

;

;

a science of morality, an ethics."
(A. Fouillee, La liberie et le dHerfninisme, sme. 6d., p. 52.)
Here, however, the subjective element, apparently excluded, is virtually included in the term
"progress." Unless progress is maintained to be a moral end, something that ought to be aimed
at, the above description may apply to biology and to sociology, not to ethics.
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surrendered his objective standard.^

I

Although he has written an

essay intended to prove that ''the criterion of ethics

is

ive reality,"^ yet he speaks of ethics as having for

its

teach us our duty;^ and this
terion,

whatever

may

it

subjective criterion
effects as

be,

for,

;

is
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an objectobject to

to recognise that the objective cri-

must be ultimately subordinated

to a

while the apprehension of a fact and

simple relations of reality

is

a mental process guided

entirely objective conditions, the apprehension of the

same

its

by

fact as

guided more specially by subjective, emotional conditions,
which, whatever our theory as to the nature of the moral feelings,
maybe included under the two general terms, "moral approbation" and "moral disapprobation."
Dr. Cams may, perhaps, say that this is a misconstruction of
his views; that, while he recognises the sense of duty, that sense
of duty is governed by the actual facts of reality, and that it is to
these facts that we must ultimately refer as being super-ordinate to
all subjective states.
He may say that once development has been
ascertained by scientific research to be an unavoidable law, we
will, as a matter of fact and of necessity, modify our sense of duty
so as to make it correspond with what we necessarily must do.
But to this the obvious answer is, that development is not a law
of human nature individually considered
that some individuals
neither wish to, nor do, "develop," and that their condition is as
much a matter of law and of must as the condition of those who
wish to, and do, "develop." The developmentalist must show
a duty

is

:

why

"better" than theirs; he must show that
more desirable and, in doing
this, he cannot help appealing to those subjective states in which
preference and desire consist.
And if, with Dr. Cams, we reject
the hedonistic theory, in which these states are reducible to pleasure and pain, we must accept the ought and the "moral feelings "
of the intuitionist, although putting on them a scientific interpretation
accept them, be it understood, as standards, guides, or criteria; for nature presents to us two opposite roads, either of which
we can, or believe we can, follow; and nothing can determine us
to follow one or the other except either our desire for happiness or
his line of action

his line of action

is

is

preferable or

;

;

ISse, €.£:., Fundamental Problems, pp. 191, 202, where "the ought in our breasts," which is
identified with Kant's categorical imperative, is declared to be "an undeniable fact" inseparable from " our moral consciousness " and where it is affirmed that, without the moral ought,
;

"

human
2

society could not even exist, nor could

The Monist

ilbid., p. 560.

I, 4,

to

which

I

it

ever have risen into existence."

have already referred.

Compare Ethical

Pj-obletn, p. 7,

and Religion 0/ Science,

p. 28.
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our sense of duty (assuming, with Dr. Carus, that the two are different from each other).
Furthermore, when we come to examine this psychological
characteristic of moral judgments,

we

find

it

in irreconcilable con-

We

principles of monistic philosophy.

with the fundamental
cannot rest satisfied with the assertion that the moral feelings are
flict

the concomitant emotional states of our general development, or
that they are ''social instincts"

which have grown together with,

and as necessary elements of, social progress, being but the consciousness, on the part of every individual, of his relations to, and
dependence upon, the other individuals constituting the society of
which he is but a subordinate part.^ It becomes indispensable to
see if those feelings be of such a nature as will agree with our scientific doctrines, and whether the sub-criterion of development
the cosmical laws. It must be
consist with the supreme criterion
remembered that, according to our view of these laws, a scoundrel
and such being
is as necessarily a scoundrel as a horse is a horse
When we are
the case, I may appeal to consciousness, and ask
convinced that the scoundrel is as much a necessary outcome of

—

;

:

cosmical laws as the tiger or the hyena, shall we, or can we, attach
to our

tion?

by

my

tion

is

judgment of his conduct any feeling of moral disapprobaIf I may, in this matter, judge of the consciousness of others
own consciousness, I think the general answer to such quesnot uncertain.

And

the reason, in

my

opinion,

is,

that the

moral feelings are not only the psychical correlates of our physical
and social evolution they have been derived, among other sources
and experiences, from the conception of man as a free agent, and
from the exclusion of man from the universal realm of nature that
is, they owe their origin to, and are based on, conceptions entirely
antagonistic to the conceptions of monism.
To say it is a man's
duty to do a certain action, or that he ought to do a certain action,
is to say that we can reasonably expect him to do that action ; is
to suppose that he can, irrespective of his special constitution,
do the action it is, in short, to suppose that it is possible for every
:

;

;

man

to act in

a certain

manner

;

and

this

is

obviously a lack of

recognition of that law of causation that asserts that a given
can act in only one way, whatever that

our uncertainty as to his real nature,
that he 7nay act as desired.

it is

way may be;

not unreasonable to think

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]
1

Such

is

the view taken by Dr. Carus.

man

although, in

(See Ethical Problem, pp.

39, 56.)

